Finally, the GDOT Defendants argue that the negligent misrepresentation claim is barred by sovereign immunity because the Plaintiffs brought the claim in federal court. (GDOT Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 16-18). The Plaintiffs did not dispute this issue in their Response. See Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A., 564 F. App’x 432, 434 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen a party fails to respond to an argument or otherwise address a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim abandoned.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, it appears that the GDOT Defendants’ position is supported by their cited authority. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b) (“The state waives its sovereign immunity only to the extent and in the manner provided in this article and only with respect to actions brought in the courts of the State of Georgia. The state does not waive any immunity with respect to actions brought in the courts of the United States.”); Alyshah v. Georgia, 239 F. App’x 473, 474 (11th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim (Count VII3 ) of the Second Amended Complaint as barred by sovereign immunity.
[. . .]
[Discrimination and Retaliation Claims.] However, there are no factual allegations plausibly asserting that Reule retaliated against Plaintiffs for filing their Title VI complaint. The Plaintiffs allege that Reule’s communications, which contradicted what the Anderson email stated, were retaliatory. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 56). However, none of Reule’s emails that allegedly conflict with the Anderson email were sent after Plaintiffs made their Title VI complaint. Cf. Manley v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 587 F. App’x 507, 512 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Yet if the alleged retaliatory conduct occurred before the employee engaged in protected activity, the two events cannot be causally connected.” (citation omitted)). The Plaintiffs also allege that Reule was one of the GDOT employees that told Plaintiffs that they were no longer eligible for GDOT contracts. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 68). The Plaintiffs provide only conclusory allegations to support their claim that this communication was made in retaliation for filing the Title VI complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 68). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim against Reule fails.
[. . .]
[Tortious Interference.] There is no dispute that SAE and RMD were competitors and that RMD acted to get business that was previously given to SAE. However, the Plaintiffs assert absolutely nothing about the means by which RMD interfered. In fact, the Plaintiffs fail to even state that RMD actually discredited SAE in its discussions with GDOT officials, just that RMD knew it had to in order to get the contract. Without any allegations plausibly asserting improper means, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for tortious interference with business relations. Thus, regardless of which tortious interference cause of action the Plaintiffs are pursuing, Count VIII should be dismissed.
