City of Atlanta prevailed at the Court of Appeals against a plaintiff’s claim based on alleged inadequate signalized pedestrian crossings.
Ryles v. City of Atlanta, A25A0485, 2025 WL 1702194 (Ga. Ct. App. June 18, 2025)
Ryles acknowledges this authority but argues that conduct that may typically constitute a governmental function may still be classified as a ministerial function where the conduct is related to the maintenance of streets and sidewalks to keep them safe for travel. In support of this argument, Ryles points to well-settled law that a municipality has a duty to maintain city streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel.
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A city’s liability in this regard is limited, however, by OCGA § 32-4-93 (a), which, stated positively, means that “municipalities generally have a ministerial duty to keep their streets in repair, and they are liable for injuries resulting from defects [in the public roads] after actual notice, or after the defect has existed for a sufficient length of time for notice to be inferred.”
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The question then becomes what constitutes a defect in the public roads under OCGA § 32-4-93 (a) and, in particular, whether the lack of crosswalks or other safety devices designed to protect pedestrians is considered a defect under the statute. This Court has interpreted the reference to “defects” in the Code section to refer to “the physical condition of the street itself,” including “defects brought about by the forces of nature and by persons and which render the street unsafe” and “objects adjacent to and suspended over the street.”
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Although this Court has not previously addressed whether a lack of crosswalks can be considered a defect in the public roads under OCGA § 32-4-93 (a), we conclude that the City’s alleged failure to install “a sufficient number of signalized pedestrian crossings” on the Parkway is more like the failures outlined in the cases in this paragraph and therefore does not constitute a defect in the road for purposes of the statute.
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Here, we are presented with a case of non-action by the City, similar to the situation in Vlass, not a case where the City installed pedestrian crosswalks and failed to maintain them. Based on existing precedent, which does not support the extension of a nuisance principle to this type of situation, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Ryles’s nuisance claim.
