City of Milton v. Chang, No. A24A0802, 2024 WL 4195584 (Ga. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2024)
“Thus, stated positively, municipalities generally have a ministerial duty to keep their streets in repair, and they are liable for injuries resulting from defects after actual notice, or after the defect has existed for a sufficient length of time for notice to be inferred.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Herrera, 343 Ga. App. at 428 (1), 808 S.E.2d 416; see also Gatto v. City of Statesboro, 312 Ga. 164, 167 (1), n. 4, 860 S.E.2d 713 (2021) (“Georgia courts have long held that the duty to maintain streets and sidewalks free from obstructions and other dangers is a ministerial duty.”) (emphasis omitted).
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Here, the testimony established that the planter was located on the City’s property in the right-of-way and on the shoulder. Additional testimony established that the shoulder was used to give drivers a place to maneuver if they needed to pull off the road or to perform an evasive maneuver, and that the presence of the planter on the shoulder was a hazard for vehicles leaving the travel lanes. There was additional testimony that the City should have discovered the existence of the planter and removed it. Given these facts, it was for the jury to determine if the planter constituted a defect. Herrera, 343 Ga. App. at 430 (1), 808 S.E.2d 416.8 And, as noted, there was evidence from which the jury could find that the planter was an “object[ ] adjacent to” the roadway, which “renders the use of these thoroughfares more hazardous.” (Citation omitted.) Kicklighter, 167 Ga. App. at 530 (2), 307 S.E.2d 47; see also OCGA § 32-4-93 (a).
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Reviewing the evidence de novo, and viewing it as a reasonable juror would, we conclude that the fact that the witnesses may have opined whether the planter was a hazard that had to be removed under the ordinances had no impact on the jury’s verdict. Given the statutory definition of roadway, the City employees’ acknowledgment that they should have noticed and removed the planter, and the other evidence regarding the vehicle use of the shoulder, such testimony did not affect the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the admission of this testimony was harmless. Ross-Stubblefield, 359 Ga. App. at 526-527, 859 S.E.2d 502.
